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Written in October 2001 as a ‘gut reaction’ to the attack on the Twin Towers,
and published first as a long article in the daily Corriere della Sera and then in
book form (in its original shape, twice as long as the article) in December 2001,
Oriana Fallaci’s pamphlet La rabbia e l’orgoglio (‘Anger and pride’) was in its
twenty-sixth edition when I bought it in September 2004. Its follow-up, La forza
della ragione (‘The force of reason’), has already sold 800,000 copies since its
publication in 2004. Oriana Fallaci has emerged after 9/11 as the strongest and
most vocal Italian representative of the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory. This essay
analyses the constitutive elements of her discourse (Italian nationalism, values
instead of history and politics, and violent speech conflating Islam, terrorism and
immigrants) and tries to understand its appeal and the sources of its authority in
Fallaci’s career, in order to outline the specific Italian version of the clash of
civilizations theory.
................
There is a simple reason why we need to talk about Oriana Fallaci (1929
2006) and her booklet La rabbia e l’orgoglio (‘Anger and pride’).1 Written in
October 2001 as a ‘gut reaction’ to the attack on the Twin Towers, it was
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published first as a long article in Corriere della Sera , then in book form 
twice as long as the original article and with a fifty-page preface  by Rizzoli
Editore in December 2001. It was in its twenty-sixth edition when I bought it
in September 2004. Rizzoli, which owns the Corriere della Sera /RSC group
and has been Fallaci’s publisher since 1953, proudly claims that La rabbia e
l’orgoglio has been the greatest non-fiction best-seller ever in Italy, selling
more than a million copies in the first ten months of publication, and has
marketed the book relentlessly. Its follow-up, La forza della ragione (‘The
force of reason’), has already sold 800,000 copies since its publication in
2004, and the two books are sold together with a self-interview as a trilogy,
advertised as a ‘gift package’. Its French and German translations also made
it to the best-seller list, and by 2002 the book had been translated and
published in Spain, Portugal, Holland, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania,
Korea and the US. La rabbia e l’orgoglio provoked a furore in Italy on its
publication, as we will see, and in France its publication by PLON was
followed by widespread accusations of racism by ‘red fascists’ and the
‘Parisian press’ (Fallaci 2002). While La rabbia e l’orgoglio appeared after a
ten-year long silence, after 2001 Fallaci made several appearances in print
and on Italian television, intervening famously against the anti-globalization
meeting held in Florence, her native city, in November 2002; against the
referendum to reform the existing restrictive legislation on artificial
insemination; and, most recently, on the London bombings of 7 July 2005
(Fallaci 2005).2 A year ago a proposal to nominate her life senator was
dismissed by left councillors in Tuscany, and upon her recent death after a
lung cancer, a controversy erupted between those who immediately wanted a
street in Florence named after her, and those who vehemently opposed it.
In other words, not only Oriana Fallaci emerged after 9/11 as the strongest
opinion-maker in Italy on the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory, but her success
and the support from readers indicate that she gave voice to sentiments which
find widespread support in Italy’s silent majority. Although the question of
Islam divides Italians in a way that cuts across traditional political faultlines,
and although Fallaci’s polemic is stridently against all existing Italian
political forces, nevertheless the appeal of her polemic to a proud national
identity and the defence of Italian territory against immigrants from Islamic
countries echoes a discourse on the defence of Italy’s, and Europe’s, ‘Christian
roots’ that finds favour among wide sections of the Italian clergy (including
the current Pope, Benedict XVI), Lega Nord and other members of the centre-
right coalition, and, most importantly, among many Italians.
This essay will investigate the roots of Fallaci’s authority and popularity in
the persona she built up over the years through her previous books and
articles. It will then analyse the ideological discourse and powerful rhetoric
of La rabbia e l’orgoglio , paying special attention to its articulation of
national identity. My analysis will follow the development of her arguments
herself as The Rage
and the Pride , the
booklet was
published by Rizzoli
New York in 2002.
There exist also
several web
translations, i.e., by
Letizia Grasso to be
found at B/http://
www.borg.com//
paperina/fallaci/
fallaci_1.html/; by
Chris and Paula
Newman to be found
at B/http:// www.
travelbrochure
graphics.com/extra/
oriana_fallaci_
anger_and_
pride.htm/; and at
B/http://
italian.about.com/
library/fallaci/
blfallaci23.htm/
2 Her previous
reportage for
Corriere della Sera
had been on the Gulf
War in 1991.
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as they appear in the book, since the structure of her polemic is functional to
its content. What is especially pertinent for us explore is the particular
ideological configuration the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory takes on in Italy
and the contingent conditions and Italian identity it is predicated upon.
Finally, in the light of the readers’ responses and letters sent to Corriere della
Sera , I will seek to assess the purchase of Fallaci’s anti-Islamic tirade and
what it can tell us about Italian attitudes towards immigration and Islam.
A n e y ew i t ne ss to h i s t o r y
If I may start on an autobiographical note, I remember reading Oriana
Fallaci’s books avidly as a teenager in Italy. I think that Intervista con la
storia (1974, 400,000 copies sold) was the first book on contemporary
history and international politics that I ever read. Then came her book on the
American space mission (Se il sole muore , 1965), followed in succession by
her gutsy, prize-winning reportage on the Vietnam war (Niente e cosı` sia ,
1969, Bancarella prize, 430,000 copies); her heart-wrenching Lettera a un
bambino mai nato (1975, 1,250,000 copies) on her naturally aborted baby;
and the quasi-novel Un uomo (1979, 820,000 copies), her declaration of
love for Alexis Panagulis and political expose´ of Greece under military rule.3
Every book contributed, as critics have pointed out, to the creation of an
autobiographical persona which has been, in writer Michele Prisco’s words,
her most successful literary creation, i.e., the gutsy, tough war reporter who
brings the same toughness to anything she writes about, the young woman
who dares to enter a man’s world, become a professional journalist and
question the most powerful men on earth, and at the same time who is not
shy to explore new sexual and emotional territories in ways that seemed to
mirror the feminist movement of the 1970s. This reputation for toughness,
for brutal sincerity (brutal hence sincere) and for being an eyewitness
remained with her. Together, these qualities made up her auctoritas . As in
her other texts, in La rabbia e L’orgoglio both the main text and the preface
begin with a self-reflexive, autobiographical incipit .
To the Readers:
I had chosen silence. I had chosen exile. Because in America, and the time has come
to shout it loud and clear, I live like a political refugee. I live in a political self-exile
that I imposed on myself, at the same time as my father did, many years ago. That
is, from the time when we both realized that to live side by side with an Italy where
ideals lay on the rubbish heap had become too difficult, too painful, and
disappointed offended wounded we left behind the great majority of our fellow
citizens. (Fallaci 2001: 7)4
3 Her novels,
including Penelope
alla guerra (1961),
Gli antipatici (1963)
and Insciallah
(1990) were, at least
initially, less
successful, though
Insciallah , which
was first serialized in
Corriere , won the
SuperBancarella
prize and has sold
600,000 copies
(Zaccuri 1997).
4 Translations from
La rabbia e
l’orgoglio and from
other Italian sources
are my own unless
otherwise indicated.
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The first part of the main text continues with her personal anger at the many
people (?) in Italy as well as Palestine who toasted the attack on the Twin
Towers. It was this deeply-felt indignation which prompted her to ‘break her
silence’. Personal reaction and strong, gut feelings are two of the basic
ingredients of the heady mixture of Fallaci’s writings.
Another source of her appeal, again thinking back to my teenager self, was
the fact that, in an age when political debates and arguments were always
couched in an extremely abstract and abstruse language (politichese ), Fallaci
wrote clearly and directly and made politics a matter of personalities. We
must remember that media interviews then were not the ubiquitous
phenomenon they are now. It gave a rare frisson to read her direct
questioning of Henry Kissinger, Golda Meir or Yasser Arafat, her hammering
them until she either got replies or showed that her subjects were shying away
from the ‘truth’ she was after. Fallaci came to the political leaders she
interviewed with the common person’s distrust of power and lack of interest
in political ideologies. Her politics was made of bold and simple ideals 
freedom, democracy, the fight against dictatorship and injustice. Much was
made in those interviews, and in later ones with Khomeini after the Iranian
Revolution and with Ghadafy, of the difficulty in getting to the interviewee,
of the dangers she exposed herself to, her ‘toughness’ in not giving up and in
standing her own ground. In her interviews with Arafat, Khomeini and
Ghadafy, Fallaci was never interested in their ideological arguments  for her
they were either fighters (‘guerrigliero ’ is the most generous term she used for
Arafat) or dictators, and as such to be despised and exposed as ruthless and,
ultimately, vain (see Fallaci 1991, 1979, 1986). The only powerful people she
took to were either women leaders such as Indira Gandhi, Sirimavo
Bandaranaike and Golda Meir, who, unlike male leaders, were open with
her about their personal lives and with whom she developed an empathy
apparently based on their common struggle and success in a man’s world; or
men who were able to convince her that power was not what they were after
 ‘gentlemen’ like Norodom Sihanouk or the Italian Socialist Pietro Nenni,
often elderly men with a touch of failure or tragedy about them.
‘Toughness’ (literally ‘balls’, ‘coglioni ’), ‘truth’ and ‘courage’ are the
badges Fallaci wears proudly in La rabbia e l’orgoglio , the qualities on
which she bases her authority and her arguments (she’s been there, seen it in
person): ‘what I am saying is a tough and uncomfortable truth’, she often
repeats, and the fact that she got attacked so violently and still said it proves
that it must be true. The back cover of Oriana Fallaci intervista Oriana
Fallaci declares it to be ‘the self-interview of a woman who has the courage
to write the truth about herself and others’, and this is a claim that many of
her readers and fellow journalists readily subscribe to. ‘Thank you for being
an authoritative source’, wrote one reader after the 2001 article,
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because, unlike many who these days claim to be experts on Middle Eastern affairs
and pontificate and speculate on such tragedies and draw from them profit, fame
and personal advantage, you have seen certain realities, you have touched them
with your own hand and you are ready to pay the price in person. (Schiavoni
2001)5
F a l l a c i ’s ro u gh rh e t or i c
‘I like the way she writes. I like her as a journalist’, Giovanni Agnelli, Mr Fiat
and one of the most powerful men in post-war Italy, is supposed to have said
when looking for Fallaci’s books at a book fair (Zaccuri 1997). Fallaci’s
writing style, direct and rhythmic, has been another important source of her
widespread appeal. A populist as well as popular writer, she appeals both to
readers who have no previous knowledge of the subject and to those who
may question her facts but are nonetheless seduced by her style.6 An
excellent essay on Fallaci’s ‘rough rhetoric’ points to the predominance of
the affective over the argumentative style (movere over docere , according to
classical Latin rhetoric), her copious use of ide´es rec¸ues and of examples
rather than arguments, and her use of enumerative figures of speech
(anaphora , parallelism with climax or anticlimax ) (Andreotti 2002; see
also Scalea 2005).7 This style was already displayed in her previous writings,
but in La rabbia e l’orgoglio and her subsequent writings on Islam it is put at
the service of a politics of hate. Warning Italians about the possibilities of an
Islamic attack, for example, after using repetition and enumeration to evoke
the beautiful treasures of Italy and the memories of Nazi outrage, she shifts
the register to that of a street fight:
I am no longer young, I was born in the war, I grew up with the war and I know a
lot about the war. And I have more balls than you, who in order to find the courage
to die must kill thousands including four-year-old girls. You wanted war, you want
war? As far as I’m concerned, let’s have it. War to the last breath. (Fallaci 2001:
345)
The register, openly colloquial, suggests a kind of rough frankness, while her
frequent use of expletives and insults is reminiscent of Lega Nord’s political
rhetoric (Andreotti 2002). Insults not only show her high level of passion
(her ‘fascinating violence’, as Franco Cardini calls it) but also that she has
torn down the ‘veil’ of hypocrisy and political correctness. In this way, gut
feelings become equated with high morality rather than with base reactions.
Hyphenating sentences when she parodies others, confessional and proud
when talking about herself and her family, ‘masculine’ and not shying away
from abuse and obscene words to signify her disdain or the barbarity of
5 Giuliano Zincone,
a columnist for
Corriere della Sera ,
has spoken of an
‘explosion of
sincerity’, by
someone ‘who has
seen many countries
and many wars’
(2001).
6 Franco Cardini, a
Catholic historian on
the Middle Ages who
belongs to the centre-
right but believes
that the enmity
between Europe and
Islam is a historical
misunderstanding,
wrote in his review of
La forza della
ragione that most of
what Fallaci said was
factually incorrect,
‘but she writes it with
her heart, she writes
it with extraordinary
power, she writes,
despite the
occasional lapse,
displaying
extraordinary
stylistic effectiveness.
Oriana is not great
for what she says
because, as I tell her
affectionately, she
doesn’t get anything
right really. Oriana is
great for how she can
say such things, for
the force she puts in,
for the pride and the
fascinating violence
she is able to express’
(Cardini 2004;
emphasis added).
7 Some examples of
ide´es rec¸ues :
Americans are all
efficient (Italians are
the opposite of
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others, Fallaci employs a style in La rabbia e l’orgoglio that has the urgency
of war reporting and is very powerful indeed. As one journalist commented,
the force of her rhetoric aims and succeeds at shaking the reader out of
complacency or cynicism. Indeed, the continuous use of military metaphors
and the praise for men (and women) with ‘balls’, the aggressive and abusive
tone and the attitude that ‘you can’t argue with these people’, all push
towards a confrontational attitude and a military resolution. In brief,
Fallaci’s is an example of what Kumkum Sangari has called the ‘rhetoric
of incitement’, a form of indirect agency in which a woman berates men for
their supposed effeminate hesitation to fight and claims she will fight instead
(Sangari 1999: 364489).8
P ro u d o f b e i n g I t a l i a n
Though inseparable from the rhetoric they are couched in, it is to her
arguments and ideas that we must now turn, for they too aroused a powerful
echo in her readers.
The genealogy that Oriana Fallaci claims for herself, and for the Italy she
purports to speak for, is nationalist and libertarian  it is a secular and
heroic line that joins the Risorgimento with anti-fascism. In the preface to La
rabbia e l’orgoglio she represents herself as a ‘political self-exile’ in New
York, following in the footsteps of Garibaldi and Piero Maroncelli, Federico
Confalonieri and other ‘patriots’ before him, and of anti-fascist intellectuals
like Gaetano Salvemini, the historian who warned Americans against the
threat of Nazi-fascism in a speech in New York in 1933. The parallel is made
explicitly: just as Salvemini warned Americans in 1933, she is now warning
the West about the danger of Islam. New York is of course a powerful
location to be writing from in September 2001, but her invocation of Italian
political exiles lends her the peculiar authority of a misunderstood prophet 
though, as we have seen, her self-imposed exile is due to her own moral
disgust towards post-war Italy rather than to any actual political persecu-
tion.9 In this respect, Fallaci’s nineteenth-century patriotism differs from
other ‘long-distance nationalisms’ in that it is not the product of a diasporic
community longing for an imaginary homeland.
References to her childhood in a ferociously anti-fascist home form a
recurrent topos in Fallaci’s texts, in her interviews as well as the more recent
pamphlets. La rabbia e l’orgoglio is dedicated to her parents, Edoardo and
Tosca Fallaci, ‘who taught me to tell the truth’, and to her uncle Bruno
Fallaci, a journalist and editor of the magazine L’Europeo , who first
introduced Fallaci to journalism ‘and taught me to write the truth’. ‘Exile
requires discipline and consistency’, she writes, two virtues she inherited
from her parents (Fallaci 2001: 13). Invoking her loyalty to her parents and
8 Sangari writes in
the context of Hindu
right-wing
mobilization in
India, led by sadhvis
or holy women who
perform this
leadership function.
9 Her statement that
‘to live side by side
with an Italy where
ideals lay on the
rubbish heap had
become too difficult’
is somewhat cryptic.
The ‘moral question’,
i.e., the critique of
corruption and other
signs of moral
degradation in the
Italian body politic,
Americans);
Americans are all
patriots (Italians are
the opposite);
America is a young
country  in the
nineteenth century it
was still building its
identity (Italy is an
old country  its
identity can no
longer be modified);
Ancient Romans
‘enjoyed watching
Christians being
mauled by lions’ but
‘a long time has gone
by and we have
become a little more
civilized’; Christians
‘enjoyed watching
heretics being burned
at the stake’; ‘some’
Islamic immigrants
work ‘because
Italians have become
so spoilt [signorini ]’
(Fallaci 2001: 1, 2, 4,
5, 23, 24, 25, 26).
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their political morality becomes a way for Fallaci to claim an unbroken line
between those moral values and her own current standpoint, bypassing any
ideological inconsistency or in fact any change of mind that may have
intervened and that may be apparent to critical readers. (As Neelam
Srivastava’s article points out, the Italian Resistance, especially on the left,
was deeply sympathetic to anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements.)
Less critical readers, however, accept the moral passion at face value, ‘a
testimonial of the highest moral sensitivity’, in the words of one reader
(Albert 2001).
The heroic, sober and high-minded Italy of the Risorgimento and the anti-
fascist Resistance, Fallaci’s argument goes, lost out after the war to the
‘other’ Italy, the Italy of trasformismo and opportunism, of self-interest and
narrow-mindedness. While we would expect the barb to be directed at the
erstwhile ruling party, Democrazia Cristiana, left-wing intellectuals (‘deluxe
cicadas’, according to Fallaci) come in for much criticism, too (Fallaci 2001:
401). Above all, they are guilty of buonismo and of short-sighted sympathy
towards Palestinians and immigrants. In fact, Fallaci is explicit in her disdain
for Berlusconi and for Bossi’s Lega Nord, who are guilty of rubbishing the
nationalist ideals of Risorgimento embodied in the nineteenth-century
tricolour flag ridden with bullets and smeared with blood that she keeps
‘for company’ in her Manhattan flat (ibid.: 65).10
As the above makes clear, Fallaci’s political position cannot be defined in
clear party terms and this reinforces the perception that hers is a discourse of
values, not of politics. Values, needless to say, are much more amenable to
division into simple binaries, good versus bad. As all her critics have
observed, Fallaci’s views are simple and Manichaeistic: good versus bad,
freedom fighters versus authoritarian dictators, etc. Historian Luciano
Canfora’s critical pamphlet on the limits of the rhetoric of democracy
observes that one of the inherent ‘problems’ of democracy is that it is a
complex system while those who vote often prefer matters to be plain and
simple and have little time for complexity (Canfora 2002). Many of Fallaci’s
readers identify her with the spirit of the late Indro Montanelli and praise
their ‘free, liberal spirit which knows how to break the buonismo of a left
which is too often disconnected from reality’, as one reader put it:
Yesterday, when communism was a concrete danger, Montanelli was not afraid of
being called a fascist; today, when in the new international order the world is
divided between those who are in favour of terrorism and those who are not,
Fallaci is not afraid of being called a racist. Her article  a visceral shout  is a well
of truth. (D’Elia 2001)
Fallaci’s discourse of values (instead of politics) is clear above all in her
treatment of the United States. America is a nation ‘born out of the idea of
has a very long
history in Italian
politics, not least
within the long-
ruling party,
Democrazia
Cristiana. It is
therefore amenable
to many political
viewpoints.
10 Despite this, Lega
Nord has
passionately
championed Fallaci’s
book, to the point of
distributing it free
during a
demonstration
against the proposal
to give immigrants
legally resident the
vote in local
elections, held in
Milan on 6
November 2003 (see
B/http://www.
stranieriinitalia.it/
notiziario2/
n3880.html/).
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freedom’ and it has taught the idea of freedom to the rest of the world
(Fallaci 2001: 71). It is a ‘young’ country which has provided a haven and
redemption to the working masses of the world. The ‘Liberated Masses’ are
the great strength of the United States, argues Fallaci, because no one can
beat down the energy of a people made up of working men who have
achieved their goals (ibid.: 75). This is why Americans are able to unite and
strive together, and the flag is the symbol of their unity of purpose.11
America, in other words, is what Italy could, but never quite manages to, be.
And it is the Italians’ proverbial lack of love for their flag and their tendency
to criticize one another even in times of need that condemns them to failure.
This ‘difficult patriotism’ is an important point and worth spending a few
words on here, since it emerges also in readers’ responses to Fallaci.
Mussolini’s roaring nationalism and Italy’s aggressive warfare were
subject after the war to several kinds of critical distancing. While in terms
of the ruling class the post-war regime under Democrazia Cristiana rule
represented a significant continuity with fascism, ideologically the new
Republic was vehemently anti-fascist (as inscribed in the new Constitution).
The experience of the Resistance was appropriated as the national founda-
tion myth, so that the new Republic could view itself as having fought
against Mussolini and having won freedom along with the Allied armies.
The values of the Resistance were  especially as filtered through the
literature of Beppe Fenoglio and Italo Calvino, the oral histories of Nuto
Revelli and films by Roberto Rossellini and Carlo Lizzani  decidedly anti-
heroic and anti-nationalist. Italian comedy (and later a film like Fellini’s
Amarcord ) made fun of fascist nationalism, espousing instead the allegedly
Italian values of individual self-preservation and indifference to all patriotic
appeals as our saving grace: Tutti a casa (‘All home’, Luigi Comencini, 1960)
is the title of a film on Italian soldiers deserting at the end of the war. In a
similar process of critical distancing through comedy and satire, Italians
were represented as not having been as anti-Semitic as the Germans nor as
snobbishly racist as the British (‘Italiani brava gente ’), a myth that Fabrizio
del Donno explodes in his contribution to this issue.
Nationalism in post-war Italy found legitimate expression only in sport,
until Bettino Craxi as Prime Minister in the 1980s revitalized national pride
as a legitimate feeling  significantly also through the Italian ‘peace-keeping’
mission in Lebanon that Fallaci celebrated in her novel Insciallah . After
Craxi, it fell upon his acolyte Silvio Berlusconi to transform football’s
national pride into a political slogan (‘Forza Italia’). National pride is a
guiding value of Forza Italia and of Alleanza Nazionale, while the third party
in the coalition, Lega Nord, has long called for regional autonomy. Thus,
Oriana Fallaci’s declared patriotism, the ‘lump in the throat’ she feels on
seeing the flag and her call for patriotism  in terms of mobilization against a
common threat and of pride in Italy’s distinguished past  invoke a
11 Fallaci’s hero in
October 2001 is New
York’s major
Rudolph Giuliani,
another Italo-
American ‘with balls’
(2001: 65).
CANNONS AND RUBBER BOATS 451........................
Francesca Orsini
sentiment which has had little public legitimacy in the past decades and,
judging from the readers’ responses, whose illegitimacy seems to have left a
gaping hole, a need in many an Italian (Fallaci 2001: 136).
‘ Them’
All Islamic states, according to Fallaci, harbour terrorists, and if they are not
obviously fundamentalist dictatorships they are so just below the surface
(‘gratta gratta ’) (Fallaci 2001: 118). The enumerative style is put to effective
use to suggest that the totality of countries where Muslims live as a majority
are all equally undemocratic, undoubtedly for the same reason: ‘[f]rom
Afghanistan to Sudan, from Indonesia to Pakistan, from Malaysia to Iran,
from Egypt to Iraq, from Algeria to Senegal, from Syria to Kenya, from
Libya to Chad, from Lebanon to Morocco, from Palestine to Yemen, from
Saudi Arabia to Somalia’ (ibid.: 23). The list is compelling, and to the reader
overwhelmed by news of bombs and unrest in all these countries it will be
convincing enough. After all, it is only ‘the so-called experts who
pontificate’, as one reader put it, who will insist that each country is a
particular case, that some are not Islamic states at all, that each makes a
different political use of Islam, etc.
‘Usama bin Laden and the Talebans are only the most recent manifestation
of a reality which has been going on for the last 1400 years’, states Fallaci
(ibid.: 117). Originality is not the most striking characteristic of her attitude
to Islam. We have all heard similar statements in the past five years. What is
striking is how she fuses together very different entities: secular fighters-
turned-political leaders like Arafat, fundamentalists like Khomeini and the
Taleban (one Shia, the other Sunni, by the way), ‘radical’ leaders like
Ghadafy, and all Muslim immigrants into Italy and all Muslims worldwide.
They are all dangerous, all real or potential terrorists because they believe in
Islam . This is the most obviously orientalist quality of her discourse, the idea
that Islam as an essentially and unchangeably barbarian religion that
motivates all its believers into a fanatic hatred for the West which overrules
all other possible impulses.12 What is peculiar to her argument is the tone
and the retrospective view on all the Muslim personalities she had met and
all the Muslims she had ever encountered or read about, and how they
connect with attitudes to Muslim immigrants to Italy, whether clandestine or
lawful and working residents. It is an attitude which Fallaci speciously
refuses to accept as racist ‘because you cannot be racist against a religion’
(ibid.: 80). The tone, used with the authority of someone who has ‘been
there’ and is ‘never afraid to speak the truth’, lends legitimacy to the
common anti-Islamic rant of the ‘man-in-the street’ and makes any kind of
nuanced or measured assessment look like a well-meaning (buonista) sham.
12 It was the
sweeping quality of
her belief that
alienated even
someone like Magdi
Allam, vice-editor ad
personam of
Corriere della Sera ,
who otherwise
admired her and felt
honoured by her
friendship (Allam
2005).
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The boundaries of licit political discourse are shifted in the process, and what
was unspeakable or could be said only among like-minded people can now
be written on the pages of the most illustrious Italian daily. Anyone who
wishes to get the full flavour of her explicit hate speeches towards Muslims
should look at one of the websites with the English translation of La rabbia e
l’orgoglio .
Arafat, Khomeini and Ghadafy are all alike in La rabbia e l’orgoglio , all
examples of bloodthirsty, ruthless and fanatical Islamic dictators. Despite
the alleged consistency, this is not even what Fallaci herself wrote in her
original interviews. Islam is never mentioned in the 1972 interview with
Arafat. Rather, the contrast between them is of ‘an Arab who believes in war
and a European who no longer does so’; a leader who is ‘all wrapped up in
his law of retribution, eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth’, and an atheist who is
nonetheless ‘steeped in Christianity, in its hatred for hatred’ (Fallaci 1991:
148). In La rabbia e l’orgoglio Arafat becomes the bawling and saliva-
spitting precursor of today’s Islamic terrorists. Addressing him directly in the
text, Fallaci now responds to the claims Arafat had then made about his
superior culture, taking arithmetic as an example, and rubbishes them
(Fallaci 2001: 87).13 Arafat was not only discourteous to Fallaci but also
seemed to her to personify the aggressive, ignorant, ‘macho’ and obscurantist
Islamic leader/terrorist (though he himself was the leader of the non-Islamist,
secular group al-Fatah). Palestinians are fixed in her mind once and for all as
those who ‘toasted’ the bombings in Lebanon that killed hundreds of
Americans and French, and who went on to ‘toast’ the fall of the Twin
Towers fall.14 Duplicitous and arrogant, they are the insidious enemies the
brave Italian soldiers of the peace corps in Lebanon were called to defend
(and the Italian left’s sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause thus
becomes a short-sighted and hypocritical  if not suicidal  choice). Either
Fallaci’s view of Arafat and of Palestinians in general changed after Lebanon
 and she claims that her 1990 novel Insciallah , though a novel, ‘is based
upon historical reality’  or in 1972 it was not licit to use this kind of
language (Fallaci 2001: 118). Her claim of ‘I’ve been shouting this for twenty
years’ indeed suggests that Lebanon was the turning point (ibid.: 79).
The 1986 interview with Ghadafy, amply reported over four days, was all
about the vanity and almost deranged ruthlessness of a dictator who believed
he was the saviour of his country and financed all sorts of international
terrorism, yet there is no mention of Islam. Interestingly, when Ghadafy tried
to mention Italy’s colonial invasion of Libya, Fallaci was not prepared to
listen (‘but that was 70 years ago!’) (Fallaci 1986: 14). In La rabbia e
l’orgoglio her interviews with Arafat, Ghadafy and Khomeini are quoted in
support of her view that ‘Islamic leaders’ are all the same, either misogynist
or lecherous or both.
13 For a detailed
reply to Fallaci’s
assertions, see El
Sebaie (2004a).
14 ‘Toasting the
horror’, like Marie
Antoinette’s mot
about croissants, is
an urban myth:
Italians also are said
to have rejoiced in a
similar way, a
falsehood that was
pointed out by
another participant
in the debate, Dacia
Maraini.
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A r t a s v a l u e
In La rabbia e l’orgoglio, Fallaci engages directly with the ‘clash of
civilizations’ theory. As a matter of fact, she rejects the term since she
cannot countenance ‘putting [both civilizations] on an equal footing, as if
they were two parallel realities of equal weight and measure’ (Fallaci 2001:
85). Instead, as if weighing the two ‘civilizations’ on a scale, she puts on one
side Greek civilization (Homer, the Parthenon, the philosophers), ancient
Rome, even Jesus (‘who taught us the concept of love and justice’). She
reluctantly includes the Church, for despite the Inquisition and her own anti-
clericalism it cannot be denied that the Church also produced all those
wonderful churches and paintings. Western classical music, science and
technology complete the score (ibid.: 86). And on the other scale, in ‘the
other civilization of guys with frocks and turbans’? ‘After much searching
here and there, one can only find Muhammad and the Qur’an, Avicenna (Ibn
Sina) and Omar Khayyam the mathematician and poet.’ ‘Stop bawling’, she
now addresses Arafat directly, ‘your grandfathers only gave us a few
beautiful mosques and a medieval religion’ (ibid.: 88).15 The Taleban’s
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas (‘my Buddhas’) is taken as exemplary of
what Islam does to art. And then we are back to the Palestinians in Beirut
and their desecration of Christian holy objects, as is faithfully ‘described’ in
her novel Insciallah .16
Fallaci’s argument about art serves not just to prove the superiority of
Western civilization but also as a point of connection with the second half
of La rabbia e l’orgoglio . This consists of a violent reaction to the ‘threat’ of
mass immigration into Italy. The emblematic case (exemplum ) she brings
here is the sit-in organized by Somali (ex-colonial!) immigrants in Piazza del
Duomo in Florence to protest against the failed renewal of their residence
and working permits and the denial of their right to bring their family
members to Italy. Fallaci did her best then to urge the mayor and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs to dislodge them, but though these figures
privately agreed with her (she claims), they refused to act, paralysed by the
fear of being called racist. Fallaci finally called the head of police and
threatened to go and set fire herself to the tent and its occupants. The police
dismantled the tent the next day.
‘ C a n n o ni o g om m o n i ’
Perhaps the most significant point in Fallaci’s Italian tirade, then, is how
the attack on the Twin Towers by a fringe of Islamic terrorists is not only
linked to the unchanging and barbaric ‘sons of Allah’, but also brought
nearer home by identifying it with immigration from the south and east
15 Sherif El Sebaie
(2004b) carefully
refutes the claim that
Islamic culture
contributed nothing
to Italy by pointing
to the many Islamic
artefacts in Italy.
16 As Luciano
Andreotti has
astutely pointed out,
‘Fallaci’s method of
presenting ‘‘our
civilization’’ through
indiscriminate lists of
great names suggests
only occasional
familiarity’ and
recalls Furio Jesi’s
definition of what he
called the ‘exoteric’
or ‘profane’ Right’s
approach to art. For
the ‘profane’ Right,
artworks and authors
do not provoke
problematic self-
questioning or
critical approaches.
They are ‘valuable
stuff’ (roba di
valore ), with no
internal, historical or
sociological
difference. This
attitude towards art
‘is characterized by
the repulsion for
history that is
camouflaged as
veneration for a
glorious past’ (Jesi
1979; cited in
Andreotti 2002).
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of the Mediterranean. Once again, no distinction is made here in her
enumerative list: Sudanese, Bangladeshi, Tunisians, Algerians, Pakistanis,
Nigerians are all alike (Fallaci 2001: 122). The discourse here becomes the
familiar one of Lega Nord xenophobia. First, all these immigrants are
criminal, and arrogant blackmailers to boot: if one objects to anything they
do, they say: ‘I’m aware of my rights’. They are all terrorists (mosques in
Italy are terrorist cells, and ‘behind every terrorist there is an Imam’) (ibid.:
126).
Significantly, Fallaci even refuses to call them ‘manual workers’ or to
equate them with the scores of Italian emigrants to America at the beginning
of the twentieth century, an important part of Italian historical memory.
That was a ‘legal’ migration, she claims erroneously, this is
illegal (ibid.: 129). Moreover, now the border police, who should send
them back, ‘welcome them with open arms, like Dame di San Vincenzo’
(ibid. 128). How can Fallaci praise the US as a crucible of peoples and then
be so hostile to immigrants into Italy? Because whereas the US is a ‘young
country’ (she feels of course no need to mention Native Americans), Italy is
‘three thousand years old’ and a monocultural country (ibid.: 12930).
Immigrants by definition threaten its cultural identity. Far from seeking to
accommodate them, the Italian government should just send them packing.
As we shall see below, many of these arguments form part of the current
Italian debate on Islam in Italy and echo feelings expressed by Lega Nord
and by sections of the Catholic Church. In visual terms, too, immigrants and
Islamic fundamentalists overlap in the image of the illegal immigrants
(clandestini ) who protested in the Italian square. As she pithily concludes, if
these ‘friends of Bin Laden’ invade ‘my Italy’, whether they do so with
gommoni (rubber boats) or with cannoni (cannons), ‘it’s the same thing’
(ibid.: 162).
G a p s , s i l e n c e s
Wordy and comprehensive, Fallaci’s apocalyptic sermon nonetheless shows
several important gaps and silences. These gaps and silences mostly take us
back to the lack of ‘colonial awareness’ in contemporary Italy that the
editors of this issue lament, and to the fact that the discourse of
decolonization was carried out only by the Italian left (see Neelam
Srivastava’s article in this volume). The most obvious thing lacking in
Fallaci’s discourse is politics, and with it history. The absence of politics is
also the absence of looking into the internal history and vicissitudes of the
postcolonial states of North Africa, the Middle East and Asia  the difficult
paths of economic development, the disappointment with the westernized
nationalist elites, the extremely ambivalent attitudes towards the ‘West’ as
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an imagined ‘other’. Retrospectively, Fallaci forgets that Arafat (and George
Habash) belonged to secular organizations, that President Assad and
Saddam Hussein did not establish Islamic regimes, and so on and so forth.
Only if one forgets all this can one indeed ask, with Fallaci and Bush, ‘why
do they hate us?’ and answer, ‘because they secretly envy us’ (Fallaci 2001:
25). It will not do to answer Fallaci’s oversimplifications with other
oversimplifications. As journalist Tiziano Terzani pointed out in his
thoughtful reply to Fallaci’s original article in 2001, this is a great occasion
to stop and rethink; and our duty as intellectuals is to create ‘fields of
comprehension instead of fields of war’ (Said’s phrase). The journalist’s task
is to simplify that which is complicated, but one should not go too far
(Terzani 2001). Instead, by placing the discourse on the level of values rather
than politics, Fallaci and her readers continue to forget history and
international politics, the exploitative and manipulative role that Italy (one
of the biggest arms producers in the world), the US and other Western
countries continue to play on the world scene. Instead, the ‘West’ can present
itself as a hapless victim, the victim who of course now should rediscover its
toughness, its ‘balls’.
I t a l i a n s a n d I s l a m
Arguably, the connection between Islamic terrorism and immigration is a
key to the pamphlet’s success. As such, La rabbia e l’orgoglio is an
intervention in the difficult and complex relationship between Italians and
Islam. This final section presents a brief overview of the positions and
players in the debate on Islam in Italy in order to understand where Fallaci is
located and why she has gained such prominence.17
As a vehicle of cultural and religious difference, Islam presents a problem
to Italian society, argues sociologist Renzo Guolo, and brings it back to other
dilemmas: the still unresolved issue of Italian identity versus national
identity, the approach a democracy should take when confronting indivi-
duals and groups carrying values that are potentially alien to its own, and so
on. Islam  far from monolithic in Italy  divides the left between
universalists and multiculturalists, it divides the Church between supporters
of Vatican Council II and traditionalists, and the right between anti-
globalists and Catholics (Guolo 2003: v).18
Despite its many invasions, Guolo continues, or perhaps because of them,
Italy is a culturally closed and fundamentally monocultural country. It has
neither gone through wars of religion nor through the pacts that usually put
an end to them. Therefore, it has not learnt to live with difference (ibid.).
Moreover, the short-lived colonial experience did not leave a mark, a
memory of ‘other’ cultures, apart from colonial stereotypes and ghettoiza-
17 This section is
based on Renzo
Guolo’s excellent
book Xenofobi e
Xenofili: Gli Italiani
e l’Islam , which
deserves to be
translated into
English.
18 Associations and
centres are divided
into those
representing ‘state
Islam’ (mainly of
Saudi Arabia and
Morocco), Islamist
groups like the
Muslim
Brotherhood, some
Jihad groups which
have used some
Italian mosques and
Islamic centre as
hiding places (as
Fallaci also
recounts), Italian
converts to Islam
who often play a
prominent role in
associations as they
can be legitimate
interlocutors for the
Italian state, and
finally ‘phantom’
Islamic
representatives (like
the convert Adel
Smith) who have
been created by the
media and acquired a
fame
disproportionate to
their real
significance. Guolo
views most of the
demands of
organizations like the
Unione delle
Comunita` e
Organizzazioni
Islamiche in Italia
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tion. Significantly, Italy’s colonial experience has not produced the kind of
‘return migration’ that other countries, such as France and Britain, have
experienced  no less traumatic for national identity, but with more
significant direct links between the former colonies and the former ‘mother-
land’.19 Thus, initially Italy tried to blank out the reality of the new
migratory waves and view them as just a temporary phenomenon. When it
finally did focus on immigration, it was only through the lenses of Italian
economy and internal security, i.e., no attention was paid to the cultural
dimension of mass immigration. Migration, especially from Muslim
countries, generated deep social anxiety, but because to raise the problem
would have meant admitting that migrants were there to stay, the anxiety
was not publicly and politically addressed (ibid.: vi). As the number of
migrants grew, Italians became divided between a large ‘party of exclusion’
and a tenacious ‘party of inclusion’, a division that did not follow the usual
political faultlines.
Guolo is rather scathing of the buonismo of the multiculturalist left,
including Rifondazione Comunista and anti-globalization groups. In his
view, their ‘spontaneous inclusivism’ overlooks the real ‘other’ in the name
of an idealized ‘other’. It fails to recognize that individual ‘others’ may not
want to integrate in the way the inclusivists suggest and that there is a big
difference between internal minorities (social or ethnic) and external
minorities. Further, ‘[n]aive multiculturalism harms the left, particularly in
its relationship with society which does not identify with its well-meaning
but ideologically integrationist messages’ (ibid.: 40). In the eyes of a society
so afraid of the future as to become an ‘anxious society’, the Italian left has
become identified with the active and willing construction of a multi-ethnic
society, and moreover in ways that will only benefit those who are not
willing to give up their cultural identity, in this specific case ‘the Muslim’
(ibid.).
‘On the left, a phenomenon with such a problematic social impact as
immigration’, he argues,
has been represented, almost obsessively, under the ‘reassuring’ formula of
the meeting of cultures, as mutual enrichment, as redemptive contamination. For
the theoreticians of multiculturalism it was almost an unimportant detail that in the
popular peripheries of Milan or Turin, or in the huge industrial periphery of the
north-east, this meeting appeared neither enriching nor redemptive. (ibid.: 41)
Multiculturalists superciliously dismiss phenomena of social rejection as
‘regressive’, often without analysing their motives. But actually anti-Islamic
reactions, however pathological, reveal the contradictions within emerging
multi-ethnic societies. They reveal the limits of Western universalism and the
(UCOII)  i.e.,
freedom of religious
practice, halal
butchers, religious
presence in army
barracks and
hospitals, the
possibility for
Muslim women to
wear the veil in
official (i.e.,
passport)
photographs  as
unproblematic and
easy to realize in
practice. What he
finds problematic are
demands connected
with family law (i.e.,
polygamy) and for
community
mediation in the
relationship between
the state and Muslim
individuals, and the
issue of
representation
(Guolo 2003: ch.1).
19 Although after
one of the Somali
suspects of the
London bombings
was arrested in
Rome, the local
Somali immigrant
community
(overwhelmingly
Christian) was keen
to emphasize not
only the different,
and older, history of
their immigration,
but also the fact that
Christians and
Muslims in Somalia
had lived together for
centuries, explicitly
offering themselves
to Italians as a model
of peaceful
coexistence (Rai 3,
evening news, 6
August 2005).
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question of identity, and bring us back to the crisis of public space, all
elements related to globalization (ibid.: 42).
The Italian right has been ambivalent towards Islam. While Berlusconi
welcomed Turkey’s entry into the EU but claimed that ‘Western civilization
is superior’, Forza Italia’s Home Minister Pisanu sounded a lone note of
pragmatism in his proposal for an institutional ‘pact’ between the state and
its Muslim residents, and Alleanza Nazionale’s Foreign Minister Gianfranco
Fini was the first to suggest that immigrants legally resident should be
allowed to vote in local elections, creating a furore (ibid.: 489). But it is the
third member of the coalition, Lega Nord, which has turned xenophobia into
a major political platform. In a critique of economic globalization that
paradoxically brings this party close to the left-wing anti-globalization
movement, Lega Nord defends Italy’s ‘Christian roots’ and indulges in open
racism. On the ground, it has led campaigns against local mosques, at times
against the wishes of churches locally. Public pronouncements by Lega Nord
figures (‘all foreigners are criminals’, ‘Muslim invaders’), often depicted as
‘amusing’ or ‘outlandish’ in the media, have produced a ‘huge linguistic and
political break’, according to Guolo, legitimizing a kind of language
previously shunned by all political elites, whether ruling or opposition
(ibid.: 70). It is a language very close to Fallaci’s also in its use of the
colloquial register and slang.20
As for the Italian Church, while Pope John Paul II favoured religious
dialogue and many parishes have welcomed immigrants and tried to
find accommodation and prayer halls for them, a less ‘open’ line has
been dominant at the top of the Italian clergy, especially in the influential
person of Cardinal Ruini, the President of the Council of Italian
Bishops (CEI) and that of Bologna’s Cardinal Biffi, who has unequivocally
denounced Islam as the ‘enemy of Christianity’, suggested that
Muslims embody a ‘different kind of humanity’ and proposed that
immigrants should be screened according to their religion (ibid.: 8792).
The new Pope, already critical of the ‘ideology of dialogue’ supported by
Milan’s former cardinal Carlo Maria Martini, has vocally articulated the
need for Europe to return to its ‘Christian roots’. Finally, among influential
‘opinion-makers’, the critics (Giovanni Sartori, Gianni Baget Bozzo, Fallaci)
are a majority.21
This overview of the range of positions vis-a`-vis Islam and immigration
among the Italian left, right, the Church and opinion-makers helps us
locate Fallaci’s discourse and recognize how, if elements of it can be
found elsewhere in the Italian political and cultural landscape, her
combination is nonetheless original and powerful. The combination,
especially of Islamic terrorism and immigration, has its own explanatory
power, which may account for the fact that after the publication of her
20 Guolo gives a
very interesting
analysis of Lega
Nord’s Islamophobia
in its political
homeland in the
Italian industrial
north-east, where
entrepreneurs require
immigrants for their
workforce and where
Lega Nord’s critique
of immigration, and
of the globalized
economy that
produces it, goes
against its own
political and social
base. Many former
Lega Nord voters
have since moved to
Forza Italia, but Lega
Nord’s continued
Islamophobia finds
echoes within them
and produces
confusion in the local
political system,
while pragmatically
local entrepreneurs
need (for example) to
build homes for
immigrant workers,
who in that work-
rich region need
houses more than
jobs (Guolo 2003:
769).
21 For example
Giovanni Sartori,
professor of political
science, is critical of
multiculturalism and
believes that
acquiring citizen
status does not
automatically entail
integration: instead
immigrants should
be ‘acculturated’ into
Western values, most
realistically not in the
first generation but
in the second
generation, through
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article many readers wrote in saying that it had ‘clarified their ideas’ on the
subject.
Bad language, familiar from Lega Nord discourse, is here ‘ennobled’ by
the authority of the speaker and the gravity of the event, so much so that
readers spoke of ‘high moral sensibility’ and hyperbolically called La rabbia
e l’orgoglio ‘one of the most exceptional statements ever written on our
world and on the West’ (Rigoldi 2001). The venomous attacks on
immigrants and on left-wing buonismo feed into widespread social anxieties
and anger at the left’s perceived naivety and culpable enthusiasm for a multi-
ethnic society. The (atheist) defence of Italy’s ‘Christian roots’ has found
favour among both Church and secular quarters, while Fallaci’s passionate
patriotism fills a vacuum that political bickering and a long-standing
suspicion of nationalism have left in many Italians.
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